Impeaching the President:
The Impact of Constituency Support on a Salient Issue

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Abstract

The effort to impeach William Jefferson Clinton for allegedly committing perjury, obstructing justice and abusing his power presents a rare opportunity to examine the behavior of representatives in response to a highly salient issue from various perspectives. Accordingly, in this paper I examine whether several theories of legislative behavior can be used to explain the roll call votes of members of the House of Representatives, both during the impeachment process and on the articles of impeachment themselves.

The theories examined involve (1) constituency influence, namely whether representatives function as delegates of their constituents, measured here by 1996 district-level support for Clinton; (2) electoral security, whether or not representatives' votes are affected by the perceived safety of their seats; (3) the impact of career paths, whether retiring members and more senior members behave differently from others; and (4) descriptive representation, whether the presence of African Americans and women, core Democratic constituencies, helped the president. Both the impeachment investigation in the House and the final votes on the articles of impeachment are modeled using ordered probit models. Both models include variables reflecting the theoretical constructs being tested, as well as control variables.

The findings indicate that while ideology was a significant determinant of the behavior of both Democrats and Republicans, members of both parties were influenced by electoral considerations, and Republicans in districts where Clinton was more popular were reluctant to support the less tenable articles of impeachment against the president.

There can be no question that the issue of whether President Clinton ought to be impeached for alleged perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power was among the most salient issues of recent congressional history. Over time became clear that there had been, at least, an intensive effort by the president to keep the truth about his relationship with a former intern a secret from the plaintiff in a sexual harassment lawsuit against him. Democratic members of Congress, particularly those in marginal districts, were widely characterized in the media as "running scared" at the prospect of the November 1998 congressional elections becoming a referendum on the president's legal problems. While in retrospect the issue does not appear to have affected the outcome of many congressional races (but see Abramowitz (2001)), there was certainly a perception at the time of the votes regarding the impeachment inquiry, particularly among Democrats who perceived that they faced difficult challengers in the upcoming election and that the president's legal problems could easily become political problems of their own. The poor Republican showing in the subsequent election led to similar speculation about the eventual fate of Republican members who supported impeachment in marginal districts.

In this paper, I examine whether this perception substantially affected the decisions of members on roll call votes. During the second session of the 105th Congress, four procedural votes were held on the House floor on the impeachment issue. While Republicans voted together virtually on all of these questions, there was considerably greater variance among Democratic members. Conversely, when votes on the four articles of impeachment were held, the Democrats (with five notable exceptions) opposed every article, while the behavior of Republican members was more varied. How can these variances in behavior be explained? Were Democrats and Republicans in marginal districts simply "running

scared" at the prospect of electoral defeat, were more deep-seated ideological beliefs being tested by their votes, or did representatives vote according to their own personal convictions without regard to partisanship or the electorate?

1   Theoretical Background

The literature on legislative voting behavior is extensive. This paper focuses on four different theories from that literature: the electoral connection and constituency influence (members' behavior is consistent with a goal of seeking reelection; accordingly they will be responsive to their constituents); descriptive representation (in this case, that African Americans and women behave differently than other members of their party); and career paths (members behave differently at different stages of their legislative careers). Each theory, and its implications on this analysis, is discussed below.

The theme of the electoral connection is familiar to most students of the U.S. Congress. As posited by Mayhew, members of Congress are "single-minded seekers of reelection" (1974a: 5) who are primarily motivated to protect their own positions in the legislature. More importantly for this analysis, members are expected by this theory to act on behalf of their constituents' interests in Congress; accordingly, their roll call behavior should be affected by their perceptions of constituency preferences (Miller and Stokes 1963: 51–52). The manner in which representatives will act, however, is a continuing source of controversy. Do members serve as "trustees" of the popular will, in the sense of Edmund Burke, or are they more direct "delegates" of their constituents? The scholarly consensus is that legislators combine these roles, but in the case of salient issues,

legislators are more likely to act as delegates for their constituents (Arnold 1990: 127–31; Clapp 1963; Davidson 1969: ch. 4; Wahlke et al. 1962: ch. 12). The overall empirical evidence for electoral considerations affecting representatives' voting has been mixed, at best (see, for example, Deckard 1976; Kuklinski 1977; Bailey and Brady 1998). However, various researchers have found evidence that state- and district-level policy preferences, as articulated in referenda, have affected members' voting behavior on such diverse issues as freezing the number of deployed nuclear weapons in the early 1980s (Overby 1991) and promoting various progressive issues such as labor rights, prohibition of alcohol and extending the franchise to women in the 1910s (McDonagh 1993).

Of course, there have been no nationwide referenda in American history[1]. Lacking such a referendum on the impeachment and district-level survey data, support for President Clinton at the previous election can serve as a reasonable proxy for the level of constituency opposition to impeachment. Although there is not a uniform presidential ballot across all 50 states, due to the varying restrictiveness of the individual states' ballot access laws[2], in 1996 the three candidates whose chances were taken seriously by the national media appeared on the ballot in every state. While we should be cautious about taking the referendum analogy too far, since the question was not put to voters in terms of whether Clinton should remain in office without reference to any other candidate, it is apt in the sense that both a referendum and a presidential ballot tap into the level of support for a particular idea (in the latter case, support for a particular individual's presidential candidacy[3]). Of course, since the specific allegations against Clinton were not made until well after the 1996 elections, and the articles of impeachment dealt with the president's conduct in the months after the election to conceal the nature of his relationship with Mon-

ica Lewinsky, the presidential vote cannot be seen as direct support (or the lack thereof) for impeaching the president; however, it can be seen as support (or the lack thereof) for him as an individual whose character flaws were already well in public view by 1996. As a more practical consideration, many supporters of the president made an effort to characterize the impeachment inquiry as an effort to overturn the results of the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections[4]. Did district-level support for Clinton in those elections, particularly the latter, act as a determining factor in representatives' voting behavior? Or did members behave differently than constituency support for the president would indicate?

Somewhat related is the question of the value of descriptive or symbolic representation in the U.S. Congress. The concept of descriptive representation, defined as the degree to which the characteristics of the population at large are reflected in the legislature (Loewenberg and Patterson 1979: 111), is increasingly relevant in the United States (see, for example, Swain 1993; Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Lublin 1997; Mansbridge 1999). In the past two decades, the federal judiciary has required the creation of so-called "majority-minority" districts in order to increase the ability of particular minority groups (notably African Americans and Hispanics) to elect their preferred candidates, who presumably will share their ethnicity (see *Thornburg v. Gingles* and *Shaw v. Reno*, among other cases). The question relates specifically to the issue at hand because of the popular conception that African-American members of Congress have been disproportionately supportive of the president and his policies (even compared to other members with the same ideological bent; see, e.g. Whitby 1997). Although there is no consensus on why it exists or how it operates, research has found some sense of "empathy" with the Democratic Party among African Americans that cannot be explained in purely ideological terms.

Similarly, Bill Clinton benefited quite handsomely at the polls from a notable gender gap in voting behavior, and Clinton himself was significantly more popular among women than among men, and he received substantial support throughout the controversy from womens' groups, despite the nature of the allegations against him—allegations not unlike those made against Clarence Thomas, who received a markedly different reception from womens' groups (see, e.g. Overby et al. 1992; Caldeira and Smith 1996). Was this gap replicated in the legislative process itself? In the most serious test of Bill Clinton's presidency, did the descriptive representation of African-American and female voters help him?

From a different perspective, that of the legislature as a place for representatives to pursue a legislative career, comes the theory of career progression. Hibbing (1991: 424) notes that while career stages have been less important to members in recent Congresses than in prior eras, distinctions in the behavior of members of varying levels of seniority can still be identified, most notably in authoring and sponsorship of legislation. Of particular importance and interest in the literature has been the decision to retire; Bianco, Spence and Wilkerson (1996: 168) found that members who retired from Congress after the 1816 session were more likely than their returning colleagues to have supported a controversial congressional pay raise. Although Bianco et al. are primarily concerned with the electoral connection, career path choices are also implicated in their research. In the case of the 105th Congress, every member had announced his or her intention to seek reelection before the Independent Counsel's referral was made to Congress; nevertheless, despite the later timing of retirement decisions in the current era, it is possible that retiring members, free of the perceived electoral consequences of their vote on impeachment, may have been more

likely to vote according to their ideological dispositions. For example, retiring Democrats might be more willing to support the president, and retiring Republicans might be less willing to support him. While the ability of researchers to empirically determine such "shirking" has been limited, at best (see Bender and Lott 1996 for an overview; for a more recent examination of the issue, see Rothenberg and Sanders 2000b), the high salience of these votes and their juxtaposition in a highly partisan environment provides a very strong opportunity to test whether members not facing reelection do, in fact, behave differently.[5]

However, when examining the votes held prior to the 1998 election, we must be careful to distinguish between members who retire from politics and those who are simply giving up their House seats to devote their efforts to securing either a place in the Senate or a state governorship. Gilmour and Rothstein (1993: 348–49) note the importance of this distinction as they examine the question of why Republicans retired from the House in greater numbers than Democrats during the 1956–90 period[6]. As a more practical matter, we might consider members who are pursuing another office to be more concerned about the electoral consequences of their floor votes than members who are retiring outright from politics. The findings of Palmer and Vogel (1995) also suggest that Democratic House members seeking election to higher office would be less likely to support impeachment, as electoral defeat might lead to a position in the Clinton administration—but presumably not for a representative who had called for Clinton's removal from office. Career progression is also of theoretical interest because of the effects it has on the composition of the party caucuses in Congress: critics of the impeachment process have argued that it was under the control of overzealous junior Republican members of Congress, in particular the same ideologues who propelled Newt Gingrich to the speakership in 1995 (and, perhaps more

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importantly, to a succession of lesser leadership posts in earlier Congresses). Is this zealotry reflected in members' voting behavior? Might there (also?) be an offsetting zealousness among relatively junior Democrats to exonerate the president?

2   Hypotheses and Variables

The theories that are being tested have a number of implications in this specific case.

HYPOTHESIS ONE: (The Electoral Connection) Members who are at the most risk of being defeated in the next congressional election will attempt to neutralize the issue of impeachment by narrowing the ideological gap between their opponent's likely stance and their own. Specifically, in marginal districts, Republicans are expected to be less enthusiastic, and Democrats more enthusiastic, about impeachment than their fellow partisans. A race is considered "close" if the winning candidate received less than 55 percent of the two-party vote in the district[7]. For Democratic members, the coefficient is expected to be positive; for Republican members, the coefficient is expected to be negative.

HYPOTHESIS TWO: (Descriptive Representation) African-American and female members of Congress will reflect their core constituencies' strong support for President Clinton (and other Democrats) and be less enthusiastic about impeachment than their fellow partisans. The operationalization of this hypothesis is through the variables "Black Representative," which is coded 1 for African-American members, and 0 otherwise, and "female representative," a similarly-coded dummy. The coefficients of these variables are predicted to be negative.[8]

HYPOTHESIS THREE: (Career Progression) More senior members of Congress, particularly

those who are not seeking reelection, are expected to be less ideologically-oriented than their colleagues (the "zealotry" thesis); senior Republicans are expected to be less enthusiastic towards impeachment while senior Democrats are expected to more enthusiastic than their colleagues; Democrats seeking another office are expected to be less enthusiastic than we might otherwise expect, in order to protect their chances of an administration appointment[9]. Seniority is operationalized here by the number of terms the member has served in Congress[10]; the decision to retire is reflected by "Retiring," which is coded 1 for members not seeking any elective office in November 1998 (and 0 otherwise), and "Running," which is coded 1 for members seeking another elective office (a Senate seat or a state governorship) in November 1998 (and 0 otherwise)[11].

Hypothesis Four: (Constituency Influence) Members of Congress will take constituency-level support for the President into account in making their decisions about impeachment. Presumably members from districts that did not support Bill Clinton will be less reluctant to "overturn the results of the election" than members who hail from districts with higher support for Clinton. The level of support for the Clinton-Gore ticket, as a percentage of the two-party popular vote in the constituency, is used as a barometer of support for the President in the member's district; the corresponding coefficient is expected to be negative.

3   Data and Models

A summary of the independent variables used in this paper appears in Table 1. The two dependent variables are as follows:

Enthusiasm An index measuring the member's support for the procedural motions in the House that preceded the drafting of the proposed articles of impeachment. Specifically, votes on four roll calls[12] are included: 425, 453, 497 and 498. (The tallies for each vote appear in Table 2.) Members' scores on this index were computed as follows:

- Members started off with a baseline score of 0.

- The score was incremented by 1 for members who voted yes on roll call 425. This vote was held 11 September 1998, on the approval of H.Res 525, which provided for "a deliberative review by the Committee on the Judiciary of a communication from an independent counsel, and for the release thereof." Members who voted yes supported the release of the Starr Report to the public.

- The score was also incremented by 1 for members who voted yes on roll call 453. This procedural vote was held 23 September 1998, and provided for tabling H.Res 545, "a resolution impeaching Kenneth W. Starr, an independent counsel of the United States." The bill was tabled by a vote of 340–71, with 23 not voting.[13]

- Members who voted yes on roll call 497 but did not vote yes on roll call 498 were given 1 additional point. These members voted for a Democratic proposal for a time-limited inquiry focused on the allegations contained in the report, but voted against the Republican proposal for an inquiry without any procedural limitations. Put another way, these members only supported an inquiry that had procedural limits on its scope and duration.

- Members who voted yes on both roll calls (497 and 498) were given 2 additional points. These members evidently "preferred" a time-limited inquiry but were willing to support an inquiry without procedural limits.

- Members who voted yes on roll call 498 but did not vote yes on roll call 497 were given 3 additional points. These members were only supportive of an inquiry without procedural limitations on its scope and time.

This complex method of calculating the enthusiasm score was selected to help detect varying levels of support for the impeachment inquiry during its procedural stages; even if this measure does not reflect actual "support" for impeachment, it does reflect members' desire to be seen publicly to support a thorough investigation, perhaps to deflect criticism based on roll call voting records in current or subsequent campaigns (see, e.g., Edelman 1964). For the purposes of this paper, members who had an Enthusiasm score of 3 or above are said to have supported a "thorough" inquiry.

Impeachment This is an index measuring the member's support for the final articles of impeachment. It is simply the total number of "yes" votes the member cast on the four proposed articles, which were recorded in roll calls 543–546.[14]

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The data set comes from biographical and electoral data about members from the 1998 *Almanac of Politics and Government*, supplemented by roll call voting data from the U.S. House of Representatives' web site, and additional information from *CQ Weekly*.

[Table 2 about here.]

Enthusiasm and Impeachment are the dependent variables in the first and second groups of models; because they are both ordinal measures of support for impeachment, rather than interval or dichotomous in nature, ordered probit (a maximum-likelihood estimation technique) was considered to be the most appropriate technique to estimate the models (see McKelvey and Zavoina 1975; Kmenta 1997; Greene 2000). The models were estimated using Stata 7's `oprobit` procedure.

Due to the high level of intraparty cohesion in both the procedural and substantive votes on impeachment, to gain better leverage on the non-partisan effects each model was estimated twice: once with all members for whom data was available included, and once only including the members from the party with greater variance on each vote. Hence, the procedural model (using Enthusiasm as the dependent variable) is estimated among Democratic members, while the substantive model (that with Impeachment as the dependent variable) is estimated among Republican members. In all, 187 of 206 Democrats in the House are included, while 223 of 228 Republicans are included in these models[15].

4 Analysis

The results of estimating the models appear in Tables 3–4; each model is estimated for all members and for the . Following the recommendations of Herron (1999), the expected

percentage correctly predicted (ePCP) and expected proportional reduction in error (ePRE) are presented[16], rather than the traditional PCP and PRE measures, to account for the probabilistic nature of the estimates.

[Table 3 about here.]

[Table 4 about here.]

In general, the models do a fair job of explaining the individual behavior of members, with the procedural model for Democrats faring better than the substantive model for Republicans. Clearly the process of impeachment involved more subtle decisions by members than simply voting on party lines, but Republicans almost unanimously agreed on the procedural motions while Democrats held the line on the actual substantive votes. Indeed, party was clearly the best predictor of support for impeachment in both the procedural and substantive stages (and despite the assertions of many Democrats, partisanship was clearly displayed by the members of both parties at varying stages of the process).

The electoral connection played a prominent, but somewhat surprising, role in explaining member behavior. As predicted, Democratic members whose seats were more threatened by Republican challengers were significantly more supportive of the impeachment process (at the .01 level of significance) than their more secure colleagues; a "median Democrat" with narrower support was approximately 22 percent more likely to support a thorough inquiry (have an Enthusiasm score of 3 or greater) than a more secure colleague[17]. However, among Republican members there was no significant relationship between the closeness of their election fight and their voting behavior.[18]

The effects of descriptive representation were mixed. While there are too few black Republican members to perform any statistical tests, among Democrats the effect of a representative being black is highly significant, leading to a substantial decrease in support for the impeachment investigation—black Democrats with were nearly 40 percent less likely than non-black members with similar ideological leanings to support a thorough inquiry. This contrasts with the lack of any significant impact due to the member's gender.

The career paths hypothesis fared particularly poorly for members of both parties. Retiring members and members seeking other office did not behave significantly differently from their colleagues[19]. However, one important part of the career paths hypothesis is completely discredited: freshman Republicans were about 11 percent *less* likely to support all four articles of impeachment than a Republican who had served seven terms; even members of the "class of 1994" who had served three terms were 7 percent less likely to support all four articles. Far from there being a "young Turk" effect in Congress, junior members did not display the sort of rigidity or ideological extremism that observers claimed was a hallmark of the 1994 freshman class. Democrats in the procedural votes exhibited no significant seniority effect in either direction.

As expected, constituency influence was a good predictor of support for the president from members of both parties; Republicans and Democrats alike seem to have considered constituency preferences when deciding how to vote on both procedural and substantive motions. Democrats whose districts heavily supported Clinton were approximately 20 percent more likely to support a less thorough inquiry than their colleagues from less supportive districts, while Republicans from districts that heavily supported Clinton were about 17 percent less likely to support all four articles of impeachment.[20]

Constituency support helped Clinton significantly—where he had it.

As we might also expect, ideology played a central role in the behavior of members. Even though ideological measures of congressional voting behavior tend to be closer to "party agreement scores" than measures of ideology *per se* (because procedural motions are often included in them), and ideology measures (being derived from behavior) are only instruments for the true ideology of members, the strong relationship between ADA scores and the votes on the articles of impeachment (as well as the earlier, more procedural motions) indicate ideology was an important determinant of representatives' vote choices.

5   Conclusions

This paper analyzed the first completed presidential impeachment process in over 140 years, examining the behavior of members of the House of Representatives from a variety of perspectives.[21]

More notably, this paper raises questions about the continuing role of social conservativism in the modern Democratic Party, the "conventional wisdom" that relatively new members are more ideologically-oriented than their more senior colleagues, and the value of descriptive representation as a means to have favorable decisions by Congress toward minority groups. This paper also presents evidence of the importance of electoral considerations and constituency preferences in member behavior; despite the "vanishing marginals," members of the House—even those in presumably safe seats—remain highly motivated to follow constituency preferences, even when pressured by ideology to vote in other ways.

Finally, the importance the framers of the Constitution gave the question of impeachment is worthy of some further discussion. There is some evidence that members behaved as though they were "delegates" of the popular will throughout the impeachment process; indeed, the popularity of the president and his policies was used as an argument against impeachment by his supporters. On the other hand, Alexander Hamilton in *Federalist 65* contemplates that both representatives and senators would seriously weigh the merits of the case, instead of deferring to constituency pressure. The framers clearly envisioned that members would rise above partisanship to judge the subject of their inquiry without reference to the results of the electoral college; yet in neither historical example of presidential impeachment has this proven to be the case.[22] Whether this is an indictment of the impeachment process as a whole, the legislators we happen to elect, or the judgment of the framers themselves, is a question worth some additional thought.[23]

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Notes

[1]However, there have been waves of similar proposals being submitted to voters in multiple states: in recent years, for example, similar referenda relating to term limits, affirmative action programs, the rights of homosexuals and immigrants, assisted suicide, and the medical use of marijuana have been submitted to voters in multiple states.

[2]For example, in 1996 only four parties' presidential candidates—Harry Browne, Bill Clinton, Bob Dole and Ross Perot—appeared on general election ballots in all 50 states, out of a much larger field of candidates who appeared on the ballot in at least one state.

[3]A preference-ranking voting system for selecting presidential electors, or similar polling data, would be even more useful for this type of analysis, but no state has implemented such an electoral system, and such polling data is not available at the district level.

[4]See, for example, the final presentation by Judiciary Committee minority investigatory counsel Abbe D. Lowell, 10 December 1998.

[5]Indeed, Rothenberg and Sanders (2000a) find some evidence of legislator shirking on this very issue.

[6]A difference-of-means test on the data set compiled for this paper supports to some extent a repetition Gilmour and Rothstein's previous findings of different retirement behavior by Republicans and Democrats. Republicans remained substantially more likely than Democrats to be retiring to run for other office. However, Democrats outnumbered Republicans among those retiring from politics (at least for the 1998 campaign cycle), a reversal of Gilmour and Rothstein's previous findings: this may be related to their theory that minority-party members are more likely to retire out of a sense of frustration than majority-party members. This question is worthy of further analysis.

[7]This operationalization was chosen to minimize the effects of extremely lopsided contests on the model; including the margin of victory directly also introduces a component expected to be extremely nonlinear in its effects on the log-odds, as many values of the independent variable would have the same effect: indicating a virtually invincible incumbent. This margin is the same as the narrower of the two margins used in Mayhew's seminal piece on the "vanishing marginals" (1974b) An alternative operationalization, using *CQ Weekly*'s October 24, 1998, list of "50 races to watch" (25 for each major party) as the indicator, performed similarly.

[8]A plausible explanation could be offered for females being more likely to support impeachment: namely, that women would be more likely than men to view Clinton's behavior towards Ms. Lewinsky and women in general as repugnant, especially in light of their reaction to the Clarence Thomas nomination. However, at least among political elites, women (particularly liberals) appeared more inclined to view Clinton as a friend to the feminist movement and to overlook his deficiencies in personal conduct.

[9]However, there is insufficient data to test this hypothesis, as only one Democrat, Charles Schumer (D-NY), sought higher office in 1998.

[10]The variable is logged as we would expect a greater difference in behavior between a first-term and second-term member than between a 15-term and 16-term member.

[11]Members who retired but intended to run for office in subsequent years, like Mike Parker (R-Miss.), who unsuccessfully ran for the Mississippi governorship in 1999, are considered to be retiring.

[12]105th Congress, Second Session, as numbered by the Clerk of the House of Representatives.

[13]We can safely assume that members who sought the removal of Mr. Starr, thus voting not to table the resolution, were hoping for a quick end to the impeachment process with no action against the president.

[14]These items have a Cronbach's alpha of 0.9454, suggesting that they can safely be summed and treated as a Likert scale.

[15]Bernie Sanders of Vermont, classified as independent, is excluded from the models; his inclusion as a Democrat makes no substantive difference. Members who took office after the beginning of the 105th Congress are excluded, as their election results may not be directly comparable to those of other members. Other members are excluded from the analysis because they did not participate in one or more of the component votes for a dependent variable.

[16]Herron's results are extended to models with polychotomous dependent variables as follows:

$$ePCP = \frac{1}{N}[\sum_i^{y_i=0} \Pr(y_i = 0) + \sum_i^{y_i=1} \Pr(y_i = 1) + \cdots + \sum_i^{y_i=k} \Pr(y_i = k)]$$

$$ePMC = \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{j=1}^{k} n_j^2$$

$$ePRE = \frac{ePCP - ePMC}{1 - ePMC}$$

where N is the number of cases, n_j is the actual (not predicted) number of cases in category j, and k is the number of categories of the dependent variable. A Stata module implementing these calculations is available from the author.

[17]Estimates of changes in probabilities of support were derived using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2000); see King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000) for details of the procedure used, and Liao (1994) for the interpretation of logit and probit coefficients more generally.

[18]This finding remains the same even if lame-duck Republicans are excluded from the model.

[19]In models combining these two variables into one dummy variable, no significant effects were found either. Separate models were also run interacting the retirement variable with the closeness of the election and the level of Clinton support in the constituency; neither interaction approached conventional levels of statistical significance.

[20]"Heavy" support was estimated at the 75th percentile, while less supportive districts were considered at the 25th percentile.

[21]An obvious extension to this analysis is to examine the behavior of senators in the impeachment trial that followed, but it is unclear whether there is sufficient data to produce a worthwhile quantitative analysis for that portion of the impeachment process.

[22]Interestingly, Andrew Johnson, like Clinton, had serious character flaws (in the case of Johnson, a prediliction for appearing drunk in public) that were highly evident to the public.

[23]Another question worth pondering is whether the Senate, had it been free of the electoral connection imposed by the 16th Amendment, would have more seriously deliberated the merits of the case against Clinton and thus better fulfilled its constitutional role.

List of Tables

Variable	Definition
Close election (1996)	The winner's margin of victory in the 1996 congressional race was less than 10 percent of the two-party vote in the district (this corresponds to a 55 percent share of the two-party vote).
Close election (1998)	The same measure in 1998.
Clinton 1996 Vote	Two-party support for the Clinton-Gore ticket in the member's constituency in the 1996 general election, expressed as a percentage of the vote.
ADA	Member's Americans for Democratic Action score during the first term of the 105th Congress.
Retiring	Coded 1 for members who did not seek reelection to the House in 1998 and retired from office for the 1998 election cycle.
Running	Coded 1 for members running for some other office in 1998, such as the Senate or a Governorship.
Terms	Current term in office for the member, as of 1998.
Republican	Coded 1 for Republicans.
Black Representative	Coded 1 for African-American members.
Female	Coded 1 for female members.

Table 1: Independent Variables

Roll call	Outcome	Democrats	Republicans
425: release report/initial investigation	Passed (363–63)	138–63	224–0
453: impeach Ken Starr	Tabled (340–71)	125–71	215–0
497: recommit/time-limited inquiry	Failed (198–236)	196–10	1–226
498: unlimited inquiry	Passed (258–176)	31–175	227–0
543: Article 1 (Perjury)	Passed (228–206)	5–200	223–5
544: Article 2 (Obstruction of justice)	Failed (205–229)	5–200	200–28
545: Article 3 (Subornation of perjury)	Passed (221–212)	5–199	216–12
546: Article 4 (Contempt of Congress)	Failed (148–285)	1–203	147–81

Table 2: Roll-call votes on impeachment-related measures

| Variable | Coefficients (Standard Error) | |
	All members	Democrats only
Close election (1996)	0.645**	0.673**
	(0.232)	(0.236)
Clinton two-party vote (1996)	–4.150***	–3.508**
	(1.060)	(1.085)
Member ADA score	–0.026***	–0.030***
	(0.006)	(0.006)
No. of terms served	–0.015	–0.018
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Female representative	0.134	0.133
	(0.243)	(0.247)
Black representative	–1.209***	–1.278***
	(0.307)	(0.309)
Republican	3.393***	——
	(0.493)	
Retiring	–0.001	–0.015
	(0.366)	(0.373)
Seeking other office	–0.689	——
	(1.083)	
μ_1	–8.417***	–8.359***
	(0.790)	(0.794)
μ_2	–6.120***	–6.065***
	(0.681)	(0.687)
μ_3	–5.095***	–5.044***
	(0.650)	(0.657)
μ_4	–3.270***	–3.192***
	(0.596)	(0.600)
μ_5	–1.940**	–1.851**
	(0.593)	(0.597)
Pseudo R^2	0.6141	0.2774
Number of Cases	393	187
Log likelihood	–200.342	–194.200
Wald test of full model (χ^2)	637.61***	149.08***
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted	72.5%	43.2%
Expected Proportional Reduction in Error	57.9%	21.9%

- Coefficients are unstandardized ordered probit maximum-likelihood estimates.

- *** indicates $p(z) < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table 3: Procedural vote models (enthusiasm score).

| | Coefficients (Standard Error) | |
Variable	All members	Republicans only
Close election (1998)	0.408	0.223
	(0.229)	(0.252)
Clinton two-party vote (1996)	−5.688***	−4.795**
	(1.331)	(1.422)
Member ADA score	−0.039***	−0.041***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
No. of terms served	0.044	0.057*
	(0.024)	(0.028)
Female representative	0.150	0.201
	(0.324)	(0.341)
Black representative	0.630	——
	(1.368)	
Republican	1.988***	——
	(0.340)	
μ_1	−3.432***	−5.287***
	(0.681)	(0.742)
μ_2	−3.187**	−4.865***
	(0.682)	(0.719)
μ_3	−2.456*	−3.943**
	(0.670)	(0.693)
μ_4	−1.344	−2.875**
	(0.649)	(0.670)
Pseudo R^2	0.5994	0.1887
Number of Cases	422	223
Log likelihood	−200.393	−180.571
Wald test of full model (χ^2)	599.72***	84.01***
Expected Percent Correctly Predicted	74.9%	56.1%
Expected Proportional Reduction in Error	61.2%	17.7%

- Coefficients are unstandardized ordered probit maximum-likelihood estimates.

- *** indicates $p(z) < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$ (two-tailed test).

Table 4: Substantive vote models (number of articles supported).